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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge  
 
A state court in Oklahoma ordered Jeffrey Boyd to stay 
away from his ex-wife and his son, surrender his firearms, and 
undergo a mental health evaluation.  After his arrest in 
Pennsylvania with a loaded handgun, a jury convicted Boyd of 
possessing a firearm while subject to a domestic violence 




appeals, contending (1) his trial was tainted by (a) improper 
jury instructions, (b) unduly prejudicial evidence, and (c) 
prosecutorial misconduct, and (2) the firearm prohibition 
violates his Second Amendment right of gun possession.  We 
conclude that any trial errors were harmless and that Congress 
can constitutionally disarm those subject to certain protective 
orders, including Boyd.  We thus affirm his conviction. 
 
Just months after Boyd’s trial, the Supreme Court issued 
Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), a decision on 
the proof required for a conviction under § 922(g).  After 
Rehaif, the Government must show not only that a defendant 
was subject to a qualifying protective order at the time he 
possessed a gun, but also that he knew about the protective 
order.  The District Court had not instructed the jury on this 
knowledge element, and Boyd now claims this error entitles 
him to a new trial.  But we will not order a new trial when an 
error is harmless, and here the trial record contains 
overwhelming evidence of Boyd’s knowledge, including his 
own admissions in a letter to the state court.  
 
Next, Boyd argues the District Court erred by admitting 
into evidence statements that he made about harming then-
President Trump’s family.  Given the limited scope of facts 
needed to prove a violation of § 922(g)(8), we are concerned 
by the decision to admit this clearly prejudicial evidence.  
Nonetheless, introduction of the statements did not contribute 
to the verdict, leaving any error harmless.   
 
Third, Boyd points to repeated statements in the 
prosecution’s closing argument that accused the defense of 
“misleading” the jury, hence alleging they amount to 




opining on the appropriateness of these statements, we 
conclude that the context, jury instructions, and weight of the 
evidence make any error harmless. 
 
Finally, Boyd contends § 922(g)(8) violates the Second 
Amendment as applied to him and others whose protective 
orders were issued without an explicit finding that they pose a 
credible threat to their intimate partners or their children.  But 
we hold that Boyd has failed to distinguish himself from a class 
of presumptively dangerous persons who have historically 
been excluded from the Second Amendment’s protections. 
And even if he could distinguish himself from this class, the 
Government’s application of § 922(g)(8) would survive 
heightened scrutiny, as the statute is substantially related to the 
goal of reducing domestic violence, an indisputably important 
state interest.  In upholding § 922(g)(8) against this as-applied 
constitutional challenge, we now join the other circuits to have 
considered the issue.  
 
I. Background 
In October 2017, Connor Manley first began noticing 
symptoms of mental health issues in his father, Jeffrey Boyd.  
Boyd’s appetite became nearly nonexistent, and he lost 
considerable weight.  He experienced seizures, panic attacks, 
and bouts of paranoia, believing that people were carrying out 
experiments on him.  In February 2018, Connor fled from his 





One month later, Connor, Jennifer Manley (Boyd’s ex-
wife and Connor’s mother),1 and Eric Hatheway (Jennifer’s 
new husband) each applied for and were granted ex parte 
protective orders in Oklahoma state court.2  The information in 
the trial record surrounding the protective order is limited, as 
Boyd successfully petitioned the District Court to exclude any 
evidence of the events that spawned its entry.  We know by 
Jennifer’s admission that Boyd had never physically injured 
her, nor could she recall his ever threatening her with physical 
injury.  Yet, based on his father’s behavior and statements, 
Connor believed that Boyd “could strike out violently towards 
[his] mother . . . during an episode [of] psychosis” and posed a 
“moderate danger” to the general public.  App. at 487.  Jennifer 
knew that Boyd possessed firearms, which made obtaining a 
protective order that prohibited firearm possession of 
“[a]bsolute importance” to her.  Id. at 283.   
 
The Tulsa County Sheriff’s Office personally served 
Boyd with the protective order.  Two weeks later, an Oklahoma 
state judge held a hearing on whether the order should 
continue.  According to the docket, the hearing took place, 
Boyd appeared, and the court took testimony.  Both Jennifer 
and Connor recounted that Boyd had the opportunity to make 
his case to the judge.  Jennifer recalled that Boyd 
unequivocally objected to everything in the order, and Connor 
recalled that his father characterized Connor’s letter to the 
court as “the craziest thing he had ever read.”  App. at 296.  
 
1 We refer to these persons by their first names to avoid 
confusion because Jennifer and Connor share a last name. 
2 Each of the three protective orders was docketed separately.  
We generally cite only to Jennifer Manley’s order and our 





The judge then continued the order of protection until 
September 2018.  It contained eleven prewritten terms, of 
which she checked three to apply as written, including a term 
prohibiting Boyd from having “any contact” with Jennifer and 
two other terms that prohibited him from: 
 
injuring, abusing, sexually assaulting, molesting, 
harassing, stalking, threatening, or otherwise 
interfering with [Jennifer,] and from use, 
attempted use or threatened use of physical force 
against [her] that would reasonably be expected 
to cause bodily injury [; and] 
 
engaging in other conduct that would place [her] 
in reasonable fear of bodily injury to [her or her] 
household members or relatives. 
App. at 550.  The judge also applied a fourth prewritten term 
to Boyd—that he “shall immediately surrender all firearms and 
other dangerous weapons within [his] possession or control 
and any concealed carry license,” with the written-in 
modification that this surrender was to be to law enforcement.  
Id. at 551.  Finally, in an open box, the judge applied two 
customized terms to Boyd.  First, he was to stay 100 yards 
away from Jennifer.  Second, in addition to these terms, which 
were also present in the earlier order served on him prior to the 
hearing, the judge ordered that Boyd undergo a mental health 
assessment and follow all recommendations.  Finally, the order 
repeated a warning present in the earlier order: “Possession of 
a firearm or ammunition by a defendant while an order is in 
effect may subject the defendant to prosecution for a violation 




In July 2018, while the continued protective order was 
still in effect, Boyd drove from Oklahoma to Pennsylvania to 
meet with Kathryn Kelchner, a woman he followed on Twitter 
and had conversed with only a few times.  Boyd showed up 
unexpectedly in Kelchner’s driveway, and she met him for 
lunch the following day.  Kelchner testified that at lunch Boyd 
stated that he was receiving messages from the CIA and 
hearing voices that told him to kill then-President Trump and 
three members of his family.   
 
Kelchner recorded some of Boyd’s statements and 
reported her encounter to the Pennsylvania State Police.  
Troopers searched for Boyd and found him sleeping in his 
parked truck.  On waking him, they asked whether he had any 
weapons in the vehicle, and he replied that he had a gun.  After 
speaking with Boyd further, the troopers took him into custody 
and searched the car, finding a loaded handgun and two 
additional magazines.  Due to Boyd’s threats against the then-
President, the subsequent investigation was conducted jointly 
with the Secret Service.   
 
Charges of terroristic threats under Pennsylvania law 
followed.  Though those charges were dropped, a federal grand 
jury indicted Boyd on one count of possession of a firearm in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which makes it a crime for 
 
any person . . . who is subject to a court order 
that— 
 
(A) was issued after a hearing of which 
such person received actual notice, and at 






(B) restrains such person from harassing, 
stalking, or threatening an intimate 
partner of such person or child of such 
intimate partner or person, or engaging in 
other conduct that would place an 
intimate partner in reasonable fear of 
bodily injury to the partner or child; and 
 
(C) (i) includes a finding that such 
person represents a credible threat 
to the physical safety of such 
intimate partner or child; or 
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits 
the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force 
against such intimate partner or 
child that would reasonably be 
expected to cause bodily injury . . . 
 
to . . . possess in or affecting commerce, any 
firearm or ammunition . . . . 
 
While in jail pending trial in federal court, Boyd wrote 
a letter to the Oklahoma state court judge to alert her that he 
would be missing his court date for the protective order.  This 
letter was entered into evidence at the federal trial.   
At trial, his counsel conceded that it was “essentially 
undisputed” that Boyd possessed a firearm in interstate 
commerce and that he was subject to a restraining order 
containing the provisions required by § 922(g)(8).  App. at 199.  
He even suggested that Boyd “would be a misdemeanant in the 




his firearms.  App. at 200, 361.  Instead of challenging these 
elements, the counsel mounted a narrow defense that focused 
primarily on the “hearing” and “opportunity to participate” 
requirements of § 922(g)(8)(A).  He stressed that there was no 
transcript of the hearing before the Oklahoma court and 
suggested that Connor and Jennifer’s testimony about what 
went on at the hearing was biased.  Boyd’s counsel contrasted 
the continued protective order’s statement that Boyd “has been 
or will be provided with reasonable notice and opportunity to 
be heard” with the “final” Oklahoma protective order’s 
definitive statement that he “has been” provided with the same.  
Compare App. at 476 with App. at 480 (emphasis added).  A 
further contention was that, although another hearing from the 
same day noted on the docket that an order was issued “without 
objection” from the defendant, the docket for Boyd was silent 
on whether he had an opportunity to object.  Compare App. at 
496 with App. at 502.   
 
In line with this strategy, Boyd’s proposed jury 
instructions included a requirement that he “knew that he was 
subject to a court order that . . . [w]as issued after a hearing of 
which [he] received actual notice, and at which [he] had an 
opportunity to participate.”  App. at 103.  The District Court 
declined to include this instruction, and the jury found Boyd 
guilty of the one count charged.  His sentence was time served, 
which amounted to just over one year of imprisonment, and 





A. The Failure to Include a Rehaif Jury Instruction 
It is a felony for a person “knowingly” to violate 
§ 922(g)(8); to do so is punishable by up to ten years in prison.  
18 U.S.C. 924(a)(2).  As Boyd acknowledges, the District 
Court was following established precedent when it interpreted 
this knowledge requirement to apply only to gun possession.  
See, e.g., United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 596 (3d Cir. 
2012).  The Supreme Court subsequently held that, “in a 
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the 
Government must prove both that the defendant knew he 
possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the 
relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.”  
Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2200.  The Government concedes that lack 
of a jury instruction stating that Boyd must know he was 
subject to a qualifying protective order was technically an 
error.  But failing to include that element in the jury instruction 
was not a structural error that requires automatic reversal.  See 
United States v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93, 103 (3d Cir. 2001) (en 
banc). 
 
1. The standard and scope of our review 
If a party timely objects to a missing jury instruction, 
we ask whether the omission was harmless, which here means 
we may not reverse if the Government shows “beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict obtained.”  Neder v. United States, 527 
 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  




U.S. 1, 15 (1999) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 
18, 24 (1967)); Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 103; Fed. R. Crim. P. 
52(a).  Otherwise, reversal is permitted, in our discretion, only 
if the error is plain and the defendant shows it affected his 
substantial rights.  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732–
36 (1993); Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 99; Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). 
 
To his credit, counsel for Boyd objected to the exclusion 
of the knowledge element.  Was that missing element, though 
an error, harmless?  The Supreme Court has upheld convictions 
on harmless error review, for example, where “the omitted 
element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming 
evidence.”  Neder, 527 U.S. at 17.  We do not read 
“uncontested” literally to restrict harmless error to cases where 
the defendant made no attempt whatsoever to dispute the 
element, but rather more generally to mean the missing piece 
“is supported by uncontroverted evidence.”  Id. at 18. 
 
The search for “overwhelming evidence” is not 
unlimited but confined to the trial record.  United States v. 
Nasir, 982 F.3d 144, 170 (3d Cir. 2020) (en banc) (holding the 
same in the context of plain error review), petition for cert. 
filed, No. 20-1522 (Apr. 30, 2021); id. at 197 (Porter, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the 
substantial-rights portion of plain error review “is essentially 
harmless-error analysis, and as the majority itself 
acknowledges, all agree that it is based on the trial record”).4  
Boyd further cites the Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in 
United States v. Medley, 972 F.3d 399, 413 (4th Cir. 2020), 
 
4 Because there is overwhelming evidence in the trial record 
alone, our conclusion would be the same if we were permitted 




reh’g en banc granted, 828 F. App’x 923 (4th Cir. 2020), 
which declined to evaluate a pre-Rehaif conviction based on 
the existing trial record because “it is inappropriate to speculate 
whether a defendant could have challenged the element that 
was not then at issue.”  Id. (citing United States v. Brown, 202 
F.3d 691, 700 n.18 (4th Cir. 2000)).   
 
Medley, however, does Boyd no favors.  For in that case 
there “was not ‘overwhelming evidence’ of [the defendant’s] 
knowledge of his prohibited status presented at trial and [he] 
did not contest this knowledge.”  Id.  We are far afield here.  
Boyd claims that, “in [his] case, his knowledge of his status 
was hotly contested,” and “[a]t his trial, [his] defense hinged 
on the argument that he did not ‘know’ that he was in the class 
of prohibited persons.”  Rule 28(j) letter, ECF No. 56; Boyd’s 
Op. Br. at 16.  And further, he proposed a Rehaif-style jury 
instruction.  We need not speculate how Boyd would defend 
against a knowledge element, because by his own admission 
he actually mounted such a defense.  Cf. United States v. 
Kaspereit, 994 F.3d 1202, 1208–09 (10th Cir. 2021) (rejecting 
an argument that failure to include a Rehaif instruction required 
a new trial where the omitted element was clearly at issue in 
the trial, stressing that “the government offered ample evidence 
that Defendant knew the order remained in place” and that the 
jury had necessarily made a finding on the defendant’s 
knowledge by finding him guilty of making a false statement 
related to the protective order). 
 
Accordingly, we can probe for “overwhelming 





2. Overwhelming record evidence establishes Boyd’s 
knowledge. 
 
In general, the Government must show that a defendant 
knew he belonged to a category of persons described by 
§ 922(g) at the time he possessed a firearm.  Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. 
at 2200.  Within the facts of Rehaif, this meant simply that 
Rehaif knew he was “illegally or unlawfully in the United 
States.”  Id. at 2194 (referring to § 922(g)(5)(A)).  But not 
every class of § 922(g) is described so succinctly, and the 
Supreme Court was careful to note that it “express[ed] no view 
. . . about what precisely the Government must prove to 
establish a defendant’s knowledge of status in respect to other 
§ 922(g) provisions.”  Id. at 2200. 
 
In the context of § 922(g)(8), the knowledge 
requirement is less straightforward. At a minimum, the 
Government must prove that Boyd knew he was subject to a 
protective order.  But is there more?  Must the Government 
further prove, for example, that he knew that his order 
explicitly prohibited the “use, attempted use, or threatened use 
of physical force”? Cf. Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2207–08 (Alito, J. 
dissenting) (suggesting that § 922(g)(8) may require the 
Government to prove knowledge of no fewer than six different 
facts). 
 
At the outset, we “doubt that the obligation to prove a 
defendant’s knowledge of his status will be as burdensome” as 
some may suggest, even under the most restrictive possible 
formulations of the knowledge requirement.  Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. 
at 2198.  We agree with the Government that the same evidence 
that shows a defendant is objectively subject to a qualifying 




to infer the defendant’s subjective knowledge of his status.  
Gov’t’s Br. at 22; see Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2198 (citing to 
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 615 n.11 (1994), to 
emphasize that “knowledge can be inferred from 
circumstantial evidence”).  For example, personal service of an 
order that contains certain terms may alone be enough to infer 
that a defendant knew he was subject to an order containing 
those specific terms.5  See United States v. Baker, 641 F.2d 
1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that personal service “may 
be desirable” in the contempt context, although it is not 
necessary if there is other evidence of knowledge).  
Nonetheless, we need not today grapple with all of the wrinkles 
that § 922(g)(8) may present because Boyd does not 
meaningfully dispute most aspects of his knowledge that 
conceivably could have been raised, and in any event all of 
them are supported by overwhelming record evidence.6 
 
5 We are particularly disinclined, for example, to allow a 
defendant to escape liability on a technicality by claiming that 
he skipped over a sentence while reading the order or didn’t 
know the exact words it contained.  Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Sequoia 
Dist. Council of Carpenters, AFL-CIO, 568 F.2d 628, 634 (9th 
Cir. 1977) (concluding that “there was evidence [to] conclude 
that [the parties] had actual notice of the order’s terms by virtue 
of their long-standing relation to the underlying controversy”); 
United States v. Christie Indus., Inc., 465 F.2d 1002, 1007 (3d 
Cir. 1972) (holding that while an order may not be ambiguous, 
“this is not to say that where an injunction does give fair 
warning of the acts that it forbids, it can be avoided on merely 
technical grounds”).   
6 Items of evidence included personal service of the ex parte 
order—a full two weeks before the state court hearing—that 




Boyd’s limited argument, both at trial and on appeal, is 
that he did not know that he had an “opportunity to participate” 
at his hearing as required by § 922(g)(8)(A).  On its face, this 
argument is plausible in light of Rehaif, which held that a 
defendant may rebut the knowledge requirement of § 922(g) 
by arguing a bona fide mistake of law, meaning that he “has a 
mistaken impression concerning the legal effect of some 
collateral matter.”  139 S. Ct. at 2198 (quoting 1 W. LaFave & 
A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.1(a), p. 575 (1986)).  
We need not decide whether a mistake-of-law defense is 
available in this context because, even if it were, we conclude 
that the Government has nonetheless provided overwhelming 
evidence to demonstrate Boyd’s knowledge.  See Liparota v. 
 
place of the hearing.  App. at 244–49, 544, 548.  And any doubt 
is resolved by evidence that Boyd was actually aware of the 
order and its terms.  A Secret Service agent testified that Boyd, 
during the agency’s investigation, told him that Boyd’s family 
had an order of protection against him.  App. at 234.  And 
further, Boyd’s actions demonstrate knowledge of two terms 
in the order: (1) he apparently attempted to sidestep the “no 
contact” term by asking his sister to convey secret messages to 
Connor because he could not communicate with him directly, 
App. at 315, 571, 579, and (2) he acknowledged the protective 
order’s mental health assessment term in a letter to the state 
court judge.  App. at 491.  It is illogical to believe Boyd lacked 
knowledge of terms #2 and #3 in the order (the § 922(g)(8) 
prohibitions) when he demonstrated his knowledge of terms #1 
and #11 (the “no contact” and mental health provisions).  
Likewise, Boyd does not argue that he lacked knowledge that 
Jennifer, his ex-wife and the mother of his son, qualified as an 
“intimate partner,” nor does he present any evidence that 




United States, 471 U.S. 419, 434 (1985) (holding that the 
Government is not required to “introduce any extraordinary 
evidence that would conclusively demonstrate petitioner’s 
state of mind . . . . [but rather] may prove [the defendant’s 
knowledge] by reference to facts and circumstances 
surrounding the case”).  
 
The order that was served on Boyd prior to the 
Oklahoma hearing stated explicitly that he would be provided 
with an “opportunity to be heard.”  App. at 544.  And the same 
evidence showing the court actually provided Boyd with an 
opportunity to participate also convinces us he knew he had 
that opportunity.  Section 922(g)(8) does not require a final 
order or a particular hearing scope or duration, and “the plain 
text of the statute indicates that the ‘opportunity to participate’ 
requirement is a minimal one.”  United States v. Young, 458 
F.3d 998, 1009 (9th Cir. 2006).  Here it means that “a 
reasonable person in [Boyd’s] position would have understood 
that he was permitted to interpose objections or make an 
argument as to why an order of protection should not be 
imposed.” United States v. Bramer, 956 F.3d 91, 98 (2d Cir. 
2020); see also Kaspereit, 994 F.3d at 1212 (“The government 
satisfies its burden if it presents legally sufficient evidence to 
show that a reasonable person would have understood the 
hearing as a chance to raise an objection, even if the defendant 
agrees to the order or does not otherwise object.”); United 
States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280, 292 (7th Cir. 1998) (concluding 
that “[t]he terms ‘hearing’ and ‘opportunity to participate’ are 
not arcane legal terms that the general public does not 
understand”).  Our sister circuits have found this low bar met 
when, for example, the defendant and the judge “engaged in a 
lengthy dialogue,” Young, 458 F.3d at 1009, but have found it 




court engaged in any type of exchange with [the defendant],” 
Bramer, 956 F.3d at 98. 
 
Both Jennifer and Connor testified that Boyd was 
present at the hearing, and they were able to hear him interact 
with the judge.  App. at 282, 295–96.  Jennifer recounted that 
Boyd unequivocally objected to everything in the orders and 
had follow-up conversations with the judge.  App. at 282.  
Connor reported that his father disputed the allegations in 
Connor’s letter to the court.  App. at 296.  Boyd presented no 
evidence to rebut their accounts of the hearing other than 
questioning their purported biases, and their accounts comport 
with the docket’s notation that he was sworn in and testimony 
was taken.  Indeed, in his letter to the state court judge Boyd 
acknowledged that he “appeared in [her] court for a hearing 
related to three emergency protective orders.”  App. at 524.7  
 
In fact, the evidence in this case—including that Boyd’s 
order required him to surrender his firearms and alerted him 
that keeping them may violate federal law—is so strong it 
could conceivably support a finding that Boyd knew he could 
not legally possess a firearm, a bar far higher than the 
Government’s actual burden.  See Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2198 
 
7 We are not persuaded that Boyd’s knowledge is negated 
merely because the hearing may have been short or by his 
comparisons to his final order and an unrelated hearing before 
the same court.  Cf. Sunderland v. Zimmerman, 441 P.3d 179, 
182–83 (Okla. Civ. App. 2019) (holding that, after a hearing, 
“the trial court has discretion to issue or continue an emergency 
temporary order” and that even though the continued order set 
a date for a “final” hearing, the parties had nonetheless already 




(distinguishing a defendant who is unaware of his status as 
member of one of the classes set out in § 922(g) from one who 
is “unaware of the existence of a statute proscribing his 
conduct”); Kaspereit, 994 F.3d at 1208 (holding that “Rehaif 
does not require that Defendant knew his status prohibited his 
possession of a firearm, just that he knew of his status—in this 
case that he was subject to a protective order such as the one 
described in § 922(g)(8)”); United States v. Maez, 960 F.3d 
949, 955 (7th Cir. 2020) (holding that “§ 922(g) requires 
knowledge only of status, not knowledge of the § 922(g) 
prohibition itself”); United States v. Bowens, 938 F.3d 790, 797 
(6th Cir. 2019) (holding that such a broad reading of Rehaif 
“runs headlong into the venerable maxim that ignorance of the 
law is no excuse”).  
 
To us “the jury verdict would have been the same” even 
if the jurors were instructed to consider Boyd’s knowledge that 
he was subject to a qualifying protective order, including that 
he had an opportunity to participate in the hearing.  Neder, 527 
U.S. at 17. 
 
B. Evidentiary Errors 
The District Court rejected Boyd’s attempt to exclude, 
under Rule of Evidence 404(b), evidence of the statements he 
made about killing the then-President or then-First Family 
members.  We address de novo whether, as a matter of law, 
evidence falls within the scope of Rule 404(b), which provides 
that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not 
admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that 
on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with 




Cruz, 326 F.3d 392, 394 (3d Cir. 2003).8  If the evidence could 
be admissible, we only review its admission for abuse of 
discretion.  Cruz, 326 F.3d at 394.  Even if that bar is met, this 
error can be harmless “when there is a ‘high probability’ that 
the discretionary error did not contribute to the verdict.”  
Langbord v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 832 F.3d 170, 196 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (en banc) (citation omitted). 
 
Admitting this evidence, which is clearly prejudicial to 
Boyd and provides little-to-no value in proving the limited 
elements of § 922(g)(8), is arguably an error.  See United States 
v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 249–52 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that 
even evidence that has some value in “complet[ing] the story 
of the crime” or “explain[ing] why [the defendant] was under 
investigation” must satisfy the requirements of Rule 403, 
which “permits a trial judge to exclude relevant evidence if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  But we 
need not hold whether the District Court abused its discretion 
in admitting this evidence, for if there was an error we believe 
that it would be harmless.   
 
As we explained in Section II.A, supra, this was not a 
difficult case to prove guilt.  The elements that the Government 
 
8 We note that this rule was revised between Boyd’s trial and 
the filing of this opinion.  Relevant to us, “the word ‘other’ is 
restored to the location it held before restyling in 2011, to 
confirm that Rule 404(b) applies to crimes, wrongs and acts 
‘other’ than those at issue in the case.”  Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1), 
advisory committee’s note to 2020 amendment.  This revision, 
for which “[n]o substantive change [was] intended,” id., has no 




needed to prove a § 922(g)(8) violation (gun possession while 
under a qualifying protective order and Boyd’s knowledge of 
the same) were supported by “abundant evidence” in the 
record.  United States v. Bailey, 840 F.3d 99, 124 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(concluding that the District Court had erred in admitting a 
substantially prejudicial video of a graphic murder, but that 
even this error was harmless in light of the strength of the 
evidence).  The Government accordingly “was able to clearly 
and convincingly prove the elements of its case without 
reliance on the tainted evidence.”  Langbord, 832 F.3d at 196.  
Even a jury predisposed to find in Boyd’s favor would struggle 
to find any way to escape the clear and overwhelming evidence 
of his guilt. 
 
C. Prosecutorial Misconduct 
In its closing the Government argued that Boyd had 
attempted to “mislead” the jury by suggesting that the 
protective order hearing was ex parte (meaning with only one 
side present).  App. at 358.  And it did not do so in passing; 
counsel for the Government used the term “mislead” or 
“misleading” five times in her closing, as well as twice urging 
the jury not to be “misled.”  App. at 358–61, 369.  Counsel for 
Boyd stated three times that he objected “as to misconduct,” 
and once he simply objected without explanation.  Id.  The 
District Court overruled each objection.  Id.  On appeal, Boyd 
argues the prosecution’s statements in closing amounted to 
misconduct and warrant a mistrial. 
 
At the outset, we digress to a slight disagreement over 
our standard of review.  The Government states the standard is 
abuse-of-discretion review over “a district court’s decision to 




States v. Wood, 486 F.3d 781, 786 (3d Cir. 2007)).  By contrast, 
Boyd agrees with an abuse-of-discretion standard but suggests 
the review should be of “a contemporaneous objection” to the 
closing argument rather than a denial of a mistrial motion.  
Boyd’s Op. Br. at 14 (citing United States v. Berrios, 676 F.3d 
118, 134 (3d Cir. 2012)).  The latter formulation better hits the 
mark here, as the District Court never ruled on an explicit 
request for a mistrial but it did overrule objections to 
misconduct.   
 
Yet we would reach the same result no matter which 
standard of review applied, as either formulation of the 
standard incorporates a harmless-error component and, once 
again, no error affected the outcome.  See, e.g., Wood, 486 F.3d 
at 789 (“[W]e still will not reverse[,] for [a] mistrial is not 
required where improper remarks were harmless”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (third alteration in original); United 
States v. Lore, 430 F.3d 190, 210 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that 
“we review the district court’s ruling on any contemporaneous 
objections for an abuse of discretion[,] . . . . [and if] an 
appellate court finds that there has been prosecutorial 
misconduct, it should reverse unless the error is harmless”) 
(citations omitted).   
 
Under harmless-error review we affirm if “it is highly 
probable that the error did not contribute to the judgment,” 
which our en banc Court has held requires we have a “sure 
conviction that the error did not prejudice the defendant.”  
United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1265 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(en banc) (emphasis omitted).9  To determine whether there 
 
9 Technically this is the standard for non-constitutional errors.  




was prejudice, we consider “the scope of the objectionable 
comments and their relationship to the entire proceeding, the 
ameliorative effect of any curative instructions given, and the 
strength of the evidence supporting the defendant’s 
conviction.”  Id.  As the Supreme Court has stated, and our 
Court sitting en banc has emphasized, “a criminal conviction 
is not to be lightly overturned on the basis of a prosecutor’s 
comments standing alone, for the statements or conduct must 
be viewed in context.”  Id. (quoting United States v. Young, 
470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985)). 
 
Here, the prosecution’s comments about the defense 
“misleading” the jury were related to the defense’s argument 
that Boyd lacked knowledge he had a full and fair hearing in 
Oklahoma state court and his focus on an unrelated hearing 
before that same court.  While we need not opine whether this 
defense theory was “misleading,” it was certainly weak for the 
reasons we stated in Section II.A, supra.  Even if the 
prosecution unfairly tainted the jury’s perception of that 
 
suggests that the purported attacks on defense counsel’s 
honesty alleged here are analogous to situations where a 
prosecutor vouches for the credibility of a witness based on 
evidence outside of the record, which we have analyzed as non-
constitutional.  See United States v. Rivas, 493 F.3d 131, 139 
(3d Cir. 2007) (noting that “the prohibition against personal 
attacks on attorneys is rooted less in a sense of decorum than 
in the same rule underlying the prohibition on vouching: one 
cannot make arguments unsupported by record evidence”); 
United States v. Dispoz-O-Plastics, Inc., 172 F.3d 275, 286 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (“[V]ouching that is aimed at the witness’s 





theory, it would have little effect on the overall weakness of 
Boyd’s case.  And although this allegation was repeated 
multiple times, it made up only a small fraction of the 
prosecution’s twenty-one-page closing argument.  App. at 
356–61.  Cf. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d at 1267 (noting that “the 
comments at issue were but two sentences in a closing 
argument that filled forty pages of transcript”). 
 
On the other hand, the District Court overruled each of 
Boyd’s objections and did not immediately issue any curative 
instructions to the jury.  But, in its final instructions to the jury, 
the Court did make clear that several things “are not evidence,” 
including “statements and arguments of the lawyers for the 
parties in this case,” thus providing at least some saving effect 
for any errors.  App. at 370.  And the clincher, as we have stated 
repeatedly, is that the strength of the evidence supporting 
Boyd’s conviction was overwhelming.  Hence we are assured 
any error was harmless. 
 
D. The As-Applied Constitutional Challenge to 
§ 922(g)(8)10 
 
Over the past decade we have faced numerous as-
applied challenges to § 922 generally, and § 922(g) 
specifically, though none before now to subsection (8).  Each 
challenge we have analyzed under the two-part test set out in 
United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010).  
See, e.g., Folajtar v. Att’y Gen., 980 F.3d 897, 901 (3d Cir. 
2020); Holloway v. Att’y Gen., 948 F.3d 164, 171 (3d Cir. 
 
10 As a constitutional challenge to the application of the statute, 
this is a question we review de novo.  United States v. 




2020); Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 346 (3d Cir. 
2016) (en banc).  That framework applies with equal force 
here.   
 
At Step One, Boyd bears the burden of showing that 
§ 922(g)(8) “imposes a burden on conduct falling within the 
scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee,” Marzzarella, 
614 F.3d at 89, meaning that he must (i) “identify the 
traditional justifications for excluding from Second 
Amendment protections the class of which he appears to be a 
member,” and then (ii) “present facts about himself and his 
background that distinguish his circumstances from those of 
persons in the historically barred class.”  Binderup, 836 F.3d at 
347 (citations omitted).  If he succeeds at Step One, then at 
Step Two the burden shifts to the Government to show that 
§ 922(g)(8) satisfies a heightened scrutiny analysis.  Id. 
 
We note that both of our sister circuits to face as-applied 
challenges to § 922(g)(8) have held it to be constitutionally 
sound, though resting that conclusion on different grounds.  
United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 801–05 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that § 922(g)(8) burdened the defendant’s Second 
Amendment right at Step One but nonetheless that the law 
survived the heightened scrutiny analysis of Step Two); United 
States v. Mahin, 668 F.3d 119, 124 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding 
that § 922(g)(8) survives heightened scrutiny without 
addressing whether it burdens a Second Amendment right); 
United States v. Chapman, 666 F.3d 220, 225 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(same).   
 
We touch on both steps and hold that Boyd cannot 
distinguish himself from a class of presumptively dangerous 




Amendment’s protections.  Thus his challenge fails at 
Marzzarella Step One.  In the alternative, we also hold that 
even if Boyd could distinguish himself from the historically 
barred class, § 922(g)(8) survives under a heightened scrutiny 
analysis (Step Two). 
 
1. Boyd cannot distinguish himself from a class of 
presumptively dangerous persons historically 
excluded from the Second Amendment’s protections. 
 
In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), 
the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment provided 
an individual right to bear arms, at least for the core purpose of 
allowing “law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in 
defense of hearth and home.”  Id. at 635; Folajtar, 980 F.3d at 
900.  Yet that right “is not unlimited.”  Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.  
The Court identified several “presumptively lawful regulatory 
measures” that include “longstanding prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill[.]”  Id. at 
626, 627 n.26; see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 
742, 786 (2010) (same).  And it emphasized that these 
prohibitions, along with two others explicitly listed in Heller 
(and not relevant here), were merely “examples” rather than an 
exhaustive list, leaving future courts to flesh out the contours 
of the Second Amendment right.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 626, 627 
n.26. 
 
For felony convictions we have held that the Second 
Amendment does not protect those who have committed 
serious crimes.  Folajtar, 980 F.3d at 902; Binderup, 836 F.3d 
at 349.  Though we have declined to limit the reach of 
§ 922(g)(1) to only those felons who were presumptively 




determination no doubt suffices to remove a person from the 
scope of the Second Amendment’s protections.  Id. (observing 
that “dangerousness was one reason to restrict firearm 
possession”).  The primal fear of dangerous persons with guns 
is backed by longstanding historical support “demonstrat[ing] 
that legislatures have the power to prohibit dangerous people 
from possessing guns,” including “dangerous people who have  
not been convicted of felonies[.]”  Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 
437, 451, 454 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting); see also 
Folajtar, 980 F.3d at 911 (Bibas, J., dissenting); Binderup, 836 
F.3d at 368 (Hardiman, J., concurring).  These include persons 
who are mentally ill, as they potentially pose a “danger to 
themselves or to others.”  Beers v. Attorney General, 927 F.3d 
150, 158 (3d Cir. 2019), judgment vacated on other grounds, 
Beers v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 2758 (mem.) (2020); see also Doe v. 
Governor of Pa., 977 F.3d 270, 274 (3d Cir. 2020) (reasoning 
that once a person has been involuntarily committed, “that 
person has joined the class of those historically without Second 
Amendment rights”).11  We have also considered danger to 
determine whether a person who commits a DUI falls within 
the Second Amendment’s protections.  Holloway, 948 F.3d at 
172–77.   
 
11 For this reason, we also reject Boyd’s argument that he is 
distinguishable from the historically barred class because the 
procedures connected with his protective order are 
comparatively less than for a criminal conviction.  Boyd’s Op. 
Br. at 30.  The barred class is broader than convicted criminals, 
and clearly was meant to include some who were not convicted 
by a jury of their peers.  The mentally ill, for example, do not 
undergo full-scale criminal trials, yet are excluded from 
firearm possession.  See generally Doe, 977 F.3d 270; Beers, 





We have not previously considered whether those who 
are subject to domestic violence protective orders covered by 
§ 922(g)(8) fall within the historical bar of presumptively 
dangerous persons.  The Eighth Circuit has and concluded that 
“this statute—like prohibitions on the possession of firearms 
by violent felons and the mentally ill—is focused on a threat 
presented by a specific category of presumptively dangerous 
individuals.”  United States v. Bena, 664 F.3d 1180, 1184 (8th 
Cir. 2011).  We adopt that conclusion, which is based on scores 
of reports reinforcing the dangers of gun possession by 
domestic abusers.  See, e.g., United States v. Skoein, 614 F.3d 
638, 643–44 (7th Cir. 2010) (collecting myriad studies in a 
case involving a domestic violence conviction under 
§ 922(g)(9)); Reese, 627 F.3d at 802–03 (citing approvingly 
these same studies in the context of § 922(g)(8)). 
 
That said, the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning does not apply 
squarely to this case.  Bena dealt with a facial challenge to 
§ 922(g)(8), arguing that on its face no circumstances exist 
under which the provision would be valid as written.  664 F.3d 
at 1182 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 
(1987)).  It expressly declined to determine whether the statute 
would be constitutional “as applied to a person who is subject 
to an order that was entered without evidence of 
dangerousness.”  Id. at 1185.  Boyd, whose order does not 
contain an explicit finding of dangerousness, thus argues the 
statute is unconstitutional as applied to him. 
 
In attempting to distinguish himself from the 
historically barred class, Boyd emphasizes that in Oklahoma 
protective orders do not require a finding that a person poses a 




impose any terms and conditions . . . that [it] reasonably 
believes are necessary to bring about the cessation of domestic 
abuse . . . or harassment.”  22 Okl. St. Ann. § 60.4.C.1 
(emphasis added); see also 22 Okl. St. Ann. § 60.3.A 
(authorizing issuance of emergency ex parte orders “necessary 
to protect the victim from immediate and present danger of 
domestic abuse, stalking, or harassment”).  We hesitate to 
place such a formalistic requirement on the many state courts 
across the country that operate under myriad procedures, and 
we will not be so obtuse as to assume a court lacked credible 
concerns about a defendant’s dangerousness merely because it 
does not say so expressly.  See United States v. Emerson, 270 
F.3d 203, 263 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e cannot say that section 
922(g)(8)(C)(ii)'s lack of a requirement for an explicit, express 
credible threat finding by the court issuing the order 
. . . renders that section infirm under the Second Amendment[,] 
. . . . [as] such findings can be as much ‘boilerplate’ or in error 
as any other part of such an order.”); see also Sunuwar v. Att’y 
Gen., 989 F.3d 239, 248 (3d Cir. 2021) (concluding in the 
context of an immigration case that “the no-contact provisions 
of a protection order inherently involve protection against 
credible threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily 
injury” because “the primary purpose of a no-contact order is 
to protect the victims of domestic abuse by the offender” 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).   
 
Here, for example, a state judge, after a hearing at which 
Boyd participated, chose to continue the protective order 
against him and found it necessary to order him to surrender 
his firearms and undergo a  mental health evaluation,12 plus she 
 
12 We note in passing that Boyd’s attempt to distinguish 




included a term that prohibited Boyd “from injuring, abusing, 
sexually assaulting, molesting, harassing, stalking, threatening, 
or otherwise interfering with [Jennifer,] and from use, 
attempted use or threatened use of physical force against 
[her].”  App. at 550.  If the state court believed that Boyd posed 
only a risk of harassment untethered from dangerousness, it 
could have issued no order at all, it could have issued only a 
“no contact” order, or it could have modified the above term to 
strike out the physical injury component and leave in only the 
directive with respect to harassment.  It instead issued the type 
of order we would expect when faced with a person who posed 
a credible danger to his family.13 
 
Given this context, we conclude that Boyd cannot 
distinguish himself from the class of presumptively dangerous 
persons who historically lack Second Amendment protections.   
 
 
vulnerable on mental health grounds as a person who was 
disarmed by a state court after a hearing and pending a further 
mental health evaluation.  See generally Doe, 977 F.3d 270; 
Beers, 927 F.3d 150.  But because the parties did not raise this 
line of argument before us, and because we can affirm without 
considering it, we do not rely on it in reaching our decision. 
13 We note, as further support that Boyd cannot distinguish 
himself from a class of presumptively dangerous persons, that 
Connor believed Boyd “could strike out violently towards [his] 
mother and her husband during an episode [of] psychosis” and 




2. In any event, § 922(g)(8) survives a heightened 
scrutiny analysis. 
 
Even if Boyd could distinguish himself from the 
historically barred class, we hold that § 922(g)(8) survives 
heightened scrutiny, meaning review for more than whether a 
statute bears a rational connection to a legitimate state interest.  
Two types of heightened scrutiny apply: strict and 
intermediate.  In determining whether a law is unconstitutional, 
laws that “severely burden” the “core” right of “law-abiding, 
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home” 
are subject to strict scrutiny, Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs 
v. Att’y Gen., 910 F.3d 106, 115, 117 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting 
Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–30, 635), meaning that they must be 
“narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government 
interest,” Drake v. Filco, 724 F.3d 426, 436 (3d Cir. 2013).  
Otherwise, intermediate scrutiny applies, meaning that the law 
must be “substantially related” or have a “substantial fit” with 
an important governmental interest.  Binderup, 836 at 341, 
356.14   
 
Here, we conclude that intermediate scrutiny applies, 
because those subject to a protective order of the type described 
by § 922(g)(8) fall outside the core group of “law-abiding, 
responsible citizens” that are most strongly protected by the 
Second Amendment.  See United States v. McGinnis, 956 F.3d 
 
14 We have sometimes alternatively characterized intermediate 
scrutiny as requiring a “reasonable fit” between the restriction 
and the important state interest.  See N.J. Rifle, 910 F.3d at 119 
(citing Drake, 724 F.3d at 436; Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98).  
We use “substantial fit” here to follow the language used in our 




747, 757 (5th Cir. 2020).  And even if those subject to 
protective orders were considered “responsible citizens,” we 
are further reassured that the burden imposed by § 922(g)(8) is 
not “severe” because the law “applies only to a narrow class of 
persons, rather than to the public at large,” Reese, 627 F.3d at 
802, and only for the discrete period of the protective order.  
See McGinnis, 956 F.3d at 757. 
 
The Government argues the relevant important interest 
is “reducing domestic violence,” Gov’t’s Br. at 63, a claim not 
seriously in dispute (indeed, Boyd does not waste even a single 
word in his briefs contesting this point).  See, e.g., United 
States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 159–60 (2014) (observing 
that the “country witnesses more than a million acts of 
domestic violence, and hundreds of deaths from domestic 
violence, each year”); Antonia C. Novello et al., From the 
Surgeon General, U.S. Public Health Service: A Medical 
Response to Domestic Violence, 267 JAMA 3132 (1992) 
(concluding that “[d]omestic violence may touch as many as 
one fourth of all American families”), cited in H.R. Rep. No. 
103–395, at 25 (1993).   
 
Boyd does dispute, however, the application of 
intermediate scrutiny on the ground that there is no substantial 
fit between the protective order prohibition and the objective 
of reducing domestic violence.  But Congress’s careful 
tailoring, which carefully removes from the ambit of the statute 
those who are least likely to pose a danger of domestic 
violence, undermines this contention.  The law protects against 
sweeping in persons captured by meritless orders based on 
false accusations that can easily be rebutted at a hearing.  It 
applies only to orders issued to protect intimate partners or 




an order that explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against them.  That is what 
occurred here. 
 
As further reinforcement, we note extensive evidence 
supporting links between firearms and domestic violence on 
the one hand, and protective orders and domestic violence on 
the other.  See Skoein, 614 F.3d at 643–44; Reese, 627 F.3d at 
802–03; see also Matthew R. Durose et al., Family Violence 
Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Just. Bureau of Just. Stat. 64 (2005) 
(finding that nearly half of inmates convicted of family 
violence and over two-thirds of those convicted of a violent 
crime against their spouse were subject to a restraining order at 
some time in their lives); Oklahoma Domestic Violence 
Fatality Review Board, Domestic Violence Homicide in 
Oklahoma 8 (2012) (finding, in the state that issued Boyd’s 
protective order, that there was a protective order used in 
nearly one quarter of all intimate partner homicides in 2011).  
For an important state interest that may touch one in four 
American families, it is hard to argue that a restriction 
temporarily limiting the gun rights of only one in hundreds of 
adults is impermissibly overbroad.15 
 
15 A back-of-the-envelope conservative estimate suggests that 
at any given time about one in every 100 adults may be subject 
to a state protective order of some kind.  See Becki R. Goggins 
& Dennis A. DeBacco, Survey of State Criminal History 
Information Systems, 2018, at t.3 (Nov. 2020), 
https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/255651.pdf (a 
Department-of-Justice-funded study reporting 2.2 million 
protection orders in databases for 38 states and the District of 
Columbia); U.S. Census Bureau, American Community 




* * * * * 
 Congress has chosen to address the searing issue of 
domestic violence by disarming persons when a court has 
found it necessary to issue a protective order that requires them 
not to harm their intimate partners or their children.  And 
Congress has chosen to do so only after that person has had 
notice and a hearing before a court.  That limitation on gun 
rights is clearly within the bounds of restrictions that the 
Second Amendment contemplates. 
 
 Boyd nonetheless contends that his prosecution in 
particular was tainted by multiple errors.  Based on the strength 
of the evidence presented at trial, however, we are convinced 
that any reasonable jury would have convicted him even absent 
all purported errors.  Overwhelming evidence shows that Boyd 
knew he was subject to a qualifying protective order when he 
 
(reporting an estimated population of 218.5 million adults in 
those 38 states and the District of Columbia in 2018).  The true 
number is probably smaller given that, as in Boyd’s case, there 
may be multiple protective orders issued against the same 
person.  And the subset of protective orders captured by 
§ 922(g)(8) likely is substantially smaller still.  Cf. Becki 
Goggins & Anne Gallegos, Nat’l Ctr. For St. Cts., State 
Progress in Record Reporting for Firearm-Related 
Background Checks: Protection Order Submissions at 9–10 
(Apr. 2016), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/249864.
pdf (noting that in New York, for example, only about 39% of 
the orders the state reported to a particular federal index “were 
federally disqualifying protection orders” when considering 




carried a loaded firearm across state lines.  That is all that 
§ 922(g)(8) requires.  We thus affirm. 
